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Abstract 
Accusations of failure by elements of the US intelligence community (IC) 
have followed in the wake of nearly every war and terrorist bombing since 
Japan’s successful strike on Pearl Harbor in 1941.  This article will illustrate 
how some problems that exist inside the “intelligence-policy nexus” are 
beyond the control of the IC.  By investigating the dynamics and tensions that 
exist between producers of intelligence (the IC) and the consumers of those 
products (policy makers), we review three different types of alleged failure.  
First, by revisiting the Chinese intervention in Korea, we show that a rarely 
listed case in the literature is in fact a classic example of producer-based 
failure generated from within the IC. However, in our study of the Tet 
Offensive during the Vietnam War (1968), we show that the alleged 
intelligence failure by producers should be more accurately described as a 
“failure of intelligence” by consumers.  Third, by revisiting the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan (1979), we conclude that there existed neither a 
                                                
1 Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are the authors’ alone.  They do not necessarily reflect the policy of 
the US Government, Department of Defense, or Central Intelligence Agency.  This document has been reviewed and 
cleared for publication by the CIA Publication Review Board.  
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producer nor a consumer failure.  The Carter Administration made a conscious 
policy choice to act surprised (when it was not).  
Introduction  
 At what point do policymakers decide to pay closer attention the nation’s intelligence 
organizations?  The answer historically has been simple: when an event takes place that surprises 
the government, alarms the public, and threatens national security.  In the popular media (print 
and online news, radio-talk shows, and television punditry) the relentless drive for audience 
share generates many accusations of “failure,” some of which are true and others not.  For 
instance, most recently in April 2013, within hours of the identification of the key suspects in the 
Boston Marathon bombing (and their possible ties to Russia), accusations of an FBI intelligence 
failure were being blasted across the media sphere, and Senator Lindsey Graham called for 
hearings.2  For the popular press, conventional wisdom holds that a fully functioning intelligence 
agency should never be surprised.3  For many pundits, surprise equates to intelligence failure and 
failure inspires calls for corrective action.  Some politicians invariably get drawn into the fray. 
The January 2011 issue of the popular publication Foreign Policy got into the act by 
reporting on “the Ten Biggest American Intelligence Failures.” 4  Their inventory of ineptitude 
included: Pearl Harbor (1941), the Bay of Pigs (1961), the Tet Offensive (1968), the Yom 
Kippur War (1973), the Iranian Revolution (1978), the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (1979), 
the Collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), the India Nuclear Test (1998), the 9/11 attacks (2001), 
and the Iraq War (2003).  Indeed, if a researcher does a quick search on the phrase “intelligence 
                                                
2See http://www.buzzfeed.com/johnstanton/key-republican-senator-calls-for-hearings-over-fbi-handling; 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/apr/22/fbi-missed-tsarnaevs-russia-trip-because-misspelli/?page=all 
Accessed 23 April, 2013. 
3This disturbing trend is even parroted by respected journalists.  For instance, see Peter Bergen’s post-Boston essay, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/27/opinion/bergen-warning-signs-terrorism/index.html?hpt=hp_t4 
Accessed 27 April, 2013. 
4Uri Friedman, “The Ten Biggest American Intelligence Failures,” Foreign Policy, January 2012. 
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failure” in Google, the resulting list of books, articles and blogs runs for seventy pages.  These 
entries are often written by authors with politically blunted axes to grind.  For instance, Tim 
Weiner’s Legacy of Ashes,5 would lead a reader to believe the history of the CIA is only 
characterized by repeated blunders buried in secrecy.  Similarly, Killing Hope,6 by William 
Blum, would have readers know that virtually every coup, assassination or other nefarious event 
of the 20th century had the hidden hand of the CIA behind it.  As a general rule, informed 
national security professionals might be annoyed by these politicized/paranoid accounts, but they 
know that spurious muckraking has always been “part of the program” in a free-speech 
committed democracy. 
Although fewer in number, the Google list also includes many serious scholarly efforts 
on intelligence issues that range from Roberta Wohlstetter’s insightful study on Pearl Harbor,7 to 
Jim Wirtz coverage of the Tet Offensive,8 to the more recent accounts of the 9/11 attacks9 and 
the Iraq WMD debacle.10  These well researched efforts were produced by thoughtful authors 
using the best materials available at the time, but as more data become available, history must be 
revisited. The phrase “available at the time” is the key point of departure for this essay.  Over 
time documents are declassified, archives become accessible, and key participants write memoirs 
that sometimes change our understanding of the actual circumstances surrounding some of these 
famous “failures.”  As such, in this essay we seek to show that the “failure” label is often 
misleading, or the scenarios involved are more complex.  In our second and third cases (Tet and 
                                                
5Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Doubleday, 2007.  
6William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II, revised edition.  Monroe 
Maine, 2003. 
7Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, Warning and Decision. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962. 
8James J. Wirtz, The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994. 
9The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2004. 
10Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iran Revolutions and the Iraq War.  Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2010. 
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Afghanistan) we show evidence that key decision-makers were informed by the US intelligence 
community (IC) that the enemy was going to attack, but choose not to respond for political 
reasons.  In coverage of the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War in 1968 we outline how the 
often-reported “intelligence failure” attributed to the CIA was instead more of a “failure of 
intelligence” by the Johnson White House.  In the former phrase, the term “intelligence” refers to 
the aggregate system of information gathering and analysis by the producers of intelligence (aka, 
the IC) and the reporting of their findings to consumers of intelligence: policy-makers and 
military commanders.  In the second phrase, “intelligence” refers to the conscious policy choices 
and decisions made by those consumers of the intelligence products.  In the Afghanistan case we 
revisit the 1979 Soviet invasion; an episode which we suggest is neither a producer or consumer 
failure, and not a failure at all.  Indeed, the Afghan scenario represents an example how 
overriding strategic calculations can best explain why the Carter Administration chose not to try 
and pre-empt the Soviet invasion.  Further, we uncover and further investigate an explosive 
claim by a key Carter Administration official (National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski) 
that the Soviet invasion was actually the result of a covert gambit designed to weaken the USSR 
by luring the communists into an Afghan quagmire. 
However, we are not apologists for the CIA or the wider American IC. We will show in 
our first case study, the Korean War, that the Foreign Policy list overlooked one of the IC’s 
greatest producer failures: assessments of Chinese intentions prior to the onset of their 
intervention in 1950.  Our analysis touches upon the theme that intra-war surprises (as witness 
both in Korea and Tet) are enabled by a set of psychological, political, and relational dynamics 
amongst consumers and producers.  The discussion of these two cases highlights how the 
intelligence is often politicized because the incentives to show progress and success in these wars 
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encouraged the suppression of warnings of dramatic enemy resilience and the danger of a 
reversal of fortune.  This theme does not apply to the Afghan case because it is a war-initiation, 
rather than an intra-war scenario.  
Framing the issue 
The literature on the intelligence process tends to treat the reoccurring problems of failure 
as a dichotomous phenomenon that can either be attributed to pathologies in the intelligence 
community (e.g. the CIA and other “producers”) or by pathologies in the “consumers”: civilian 
politicians, and senior military officials.  However, very few studies in the literature on 
intelligence failure pay enough attention to the dynamics of sustained interaction between 
intelligence producers and policy-makers.  Some prominent scholars focus on the starkly 
different milieus in which consumers and producers operate and pinpoint how different 
subcultures and incentive structures make it difficult for consumers and producers to work 
together effectively.11  Our cases highlight the extent to which each Administration or individual 
military command tends to instantiate a unique set of norms which shapes the way producers and 
consumers interact.  Thus it is sometimes not the differences between producer and consumer 
that need to be closely analyzed, but rather the patterns of sustained interaction between the two 
types of actors.  We seek to focus on these patterns by using concepts drawn from scholarship 
that has focused primarily on the interagency process. 
Professor Amy Zegart, one of the leading scholars of the interagency has used an 
approach that combines elements of realism, institutionalism, and organizational theory to 
analyze the “whole of government” process.  To date, Zegart (and others) have tended to 
generate predictions that pathologies in the interagency process will stem mostly from a 
                                                
11Mark Lowenthal, “Tribal tongues: consumers, intelligence producers”, in Loch Johnson and James Wirtz (eds) 
Strategic intelligence: windows into a secret world. (LA: Roxbury 2004) pp. 234-241.  
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president’s inability to exert sufficient oversight and control over intransigent operational 
agencies: both the formulation and implementation of national security policy.  Rooted in micro-
economic models, Zegart’s institutional/bureaucratic approach tends to focus on information 
asymmetries between top decision-makers, who are conceptualized as principals, and lower level 
bureaucratic actors, who are conceptualized as agents.12  This analytical approach posits that 
information asymmetries lead to the existence of a principal-agent pathologies that allow the 
lower level bureaucratic entities or agents to pursue their own bureaucratic interests and to resist 
the policy guidance of the principals to varying degrees 13  In a recent study, Chun and Jones 
show how these information asymmetries can lead to adverse selection and moral hazard 
dynamics that can undercut the ability of the principals to exert control.14  In the context of the 
intelligence process and national security policy-making, the information asymmetries and 
conflicts of interest that comprise the principal agent problem are exacerbated by a significant 
cultural divide that often separates intelligence professionals and policy-makers.15  In recognition 
of these cultural differences, we will use the terms producer and consumer in this paper to denote 
principals and agents that constitute the “intelligence-policy nexus” within the national security 
bureaucracy.  While we don’t dispute Zegart and others’ general findings, our following analysis 
suggest that either the principals (consumers), or the agents (producers), can be the primary locus 
                                                
12See Amy Zegart, Flawed by design: The evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC, (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press: 
1999), pp.46-53.  See also K.S. Clayton Chun and Frank Jones, “Learning to play the game: The national security 
policy-making process”, in Affairs of state: the interagency and national security, Gabriel Marcella Ed, (Carlisle: 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2008) pp 171-214. For an in-depth economic treatment of principal-agent theory see 
Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, The theory of incentives: the principal agent model, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002).  For a concise overview of early efforts to apply  the principal agent framework 
to public bureaucracies, see Barry Weingast, “The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal-agent 
perspective,” in Public Choice  (1984) 44 147-92, and Terry Moe, “The new economics of organization”, in 
American Journal of Political Science (1984) 28 739-77. For a more recent application of the principal-agent 
framework see Francis Fukuyama, State building: governance and world order in the 21st century. (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2004). 
13Zegart, pp. 46-48.  
14Chun and Jones, pp. 199-205.  
15Lowenthal, “Tribal tongues”, pp. 234-241. 
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of failure depending on the situation.  Two of our case studies highlight the causal significance 
of conscious action on the part of either producers or consumers to distort intelligence in order to 
support a pre-existing policy agenda.16 
Our case studies also explore the broader issue of politicization of intelligence.17  As 
Richard Betts has argued persuasively, there exists a broad spectrum of intelligence 
politicization, and on the lower end the infusion of political significance into analysis can 
actually be beneficial to the extent that it allows the analytical product to have more relevance 
for policy-makers.18  Following Betts we define politicization as clearly pathological when it 
“suppresses or distorts the truth to promote a political agenda.”19 This pathological threshold is 
clearly crossed in two of our case studies where either a rogue producer or a rogue consumer 
intentionally distorted analytical products in order to provide support for pre-existing policy 
agendas.  Ultimately, however, it is the patterns of sustained interaction between producers and 
consumers in what some intelligence scholars have called the “intelligence-policy nexus” where 
the complexity and richness of these stories are found.20 
CASE 1: Korea 
The failure on the part of the intelligence community to predict the Chinese intervention 
into the Korean War has all of the hallmarks of a producer-based intelligence failure.  Analysts 
and managers in both military intelligence units and the CIA had timely access to warning 
indicators at the tactical, operational and strategic level which established both Chinese 
                                                
16For a exploration of the role of conscious action in distorting intelligence see Uri Bar Joseph and Jack Levy, 
“Conscious action and intelligence failure,” Political Science Quarterly, 124/3 (2009) . 
17Harry Howe Ransom, “The Politicization of Intelligence” in Loch Johnson and James Wirtz (eds) Strategic 
intelligence: windows into a secret world, (LA: Roxbury 2004) pp. 182. Richard Betts, Enemies of intelligence: 
knowledge and power in American national security, (NY: Columbia University Press 2007) Chapter 4.   
18Richard Betts, Enemies of intelligence, p. 67. 
19 Ibid.  
20James Wirtz, “The intelligence-policy nexus” in Loch Johnson (ed.), Strategic Intelligence , Vol. 1. (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 2007) 139-150. See also Arthur Hulnick, “The intelligence producer-policy consumer linkage: a 
theoretical approach,” Intelligence and national security, 1 (May 1986)  pp. 212-233.  
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capability and intention to intervene militarily if American forces moved above the 38th parallel 
into North Korean territory.  The damage done as a result of this intelligence failure, both to 
American strategic interests and in the form of large scale casualties inflicted on its forces 
fighting in North Korea, was extensive.  The causes of failure in this case fall into both the 
people and process categories.  From a process standpoint, the failure to predict Chinese entry 
into the war is noteworthy for the extent to which the entire intelligence community (and the 
policy principals for that matter) were dependent upon General Douglas MacArthur’s Far East 
Command, for the evolving situation in Korea.21  The case also provides strong empirical support 
for the principal-agent paradigm of bureaucratic policy process pathologies.  From an individual 
level perspective, this case is even more noteworthy for the extent to which one individual, 
Major General Charles Willoughby performed as a rogue producer, consciously shaping the 
intelligence product to downplay the possibility of Chinese military intervention. 
Willoughby’s pattern of behavior during this episode is an amalgam of Bar Joseph and 
Levy’s “intelligence to please” and “organizational restructuring” forms of conscious action 
intelligence distortion.22  Willoughby appears to have tailored his analytical products because he 
knew that the threat of Chinese intervention might cause civilian leaders to force MacArthur to 
halt his advance to the Yalu River.  There is also evidence that in addition to tailoring the 
analytical product to facilitate MacArthur’s operational agenda in Korea, Willoughby willfully 
impeded the upward flow of intelligence that pointed to Chinese intention to intervene, thus 
constituting what Bar Joseph and Levy refer to as organizational restructuring.23  Perhaps 
because it was heavily dependent upon the Willoughby’s Far East Command’s (FEC) 
                                                
21Justin Haynes, “Intelligence failure in Korea: Major General Charles A. Willoughby’s role in the United Nations 
Command’s defeat in November, 1950”.  M.A. thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College pp. 63-64.    
22Bar Joseph and Levy, ‘Conscious action and intelligence failure,’ p. 462. 
23Ibid. 
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intelligence products on the situation in Korea, CIA analysis followed a similar pattern of 
processing incoming warning indicators with rationalizations that downplayed the threat of 
Chinese intervention. 
Mounting evidence of Chinese capabilities and intentions to intervene 
From late July through early November of 1950, there was a constant inflow of warning 
indicators which showed a growing Chinese capability and intention to intervene if UN forces 
moved into North Korea.  On 28 July a CIA weekly summary indicated that upwards of 50,000 
ethnic Korean members of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might be brought in to 
reinforce the North Korean Army.24  This same CIA report concluded that China would refrain 
from allowing its soldiers to participate in the Korean War because such a provocative action 
would be discouraged by the Soviets who were concerned with avoiding an all-out global war 
with the U.S.A.   This was based on a widely shared assumption in the intelligence community 
and among policy principals that the Chinese were a mere satellite of the Soviets, and that the 
former would never initiate a major confrontation with the West without explicit authorization 
from the latter.25  Thus it was assumed that Chinese behavior in Korea would be shaped by 
Soviet interests rather than by Chinese interests.  To the extent that such assumptions persisted 
over the July to November time period, this may suggest a number of cognitive psychological 
explanations for the failure to predict the Chinese intervention.26 
The warnings continued to accumulate. An FEC intelligence report in late August 
estimated that there were nearly a quarter million PLA troops and another 374, 000 Chinese 
                                                
24P.K. Rose, “Two strategic intelligence mistakes in Korea, 1950” Central Intelligence Agency Center for the Study 
of Intelligence, at < https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of -intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/> 
Accessed 15 August 2012. 
25Ibid. 
26See Robert Jervis, Perception and misperception in international politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
1976. 
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militia troops stationed in Manchuria near the Korean border.27  The Chinese government, using 
domestic propaganda outlets and diplomatic channels, began to express concern publicly about 
the prospects of the defeat of the North Korean Army and the occupation by American and U.N.  
troops.28  A CIA memo issued on September 8th reported that the Chinese had over 200, 000 
PLA forces in Manchuria near the border with Korea, and that the Chinese were providing covert 
assistance to North Korean forces, but still concluded that overt Chinese intervention was 
unlikely without Soviet authorization.29 
In late September after the successful Inchon invasion clearly put the North Korean 
forces on the defensive, Chinese officials sent a flurry of statements through diplomatic channels 
designed to warn the United States that China would not stand by and let its ally be defeated.30  
These signals culminated on 2 October with a clear warning from Chinese Foreign Minister 
Zhou En-Lai which he conveyed to the United States via the Indian Ambassador to Peking, K.M. 
Pannikar.  Zhou told the Pannikar that “The U.S. troops are going to cross the 38th Parallel in an 
attempt to extend the war.  If the U.S. troops really do so, we cannot sit idly by and remain 
indifferent.  We will intervene.”31  To this point, the American intelligence community had only 
had operational indicators that pointed to a Chinese capability to intervene.  Now they had a 
clear strategic warning from the highest levels of the Chinese government. 
Willoughby’s manipulation of the intelligence 
  It should be noted that General Willoughby personally supervised the production of the 
Daily Intelligence Summaries (DIS) that were the single most important source of intelligence on 
                                                
27Rose, ‘Two strategic intelligence mistakes in Korea, 1950,’ p. 3. 
28Ibid.  
29Alexander Ovedenko, “(Mis)interpreting threats: a case study of the Korean War”, Security Studies, 16/2 (2007) p. 
262. 
30Rose, ‘Two strategic intelligence mistakes in Korea, 1950,’ p. 4. 
31Haynes, ‘Intelligence failure in Korea,’ p. 17.  
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Korea for both the Pentagon and for the civilian policy-makers in Washington.32  These DIS’s 
provided the basis for CIA’s Daily Summaries and accounted for 90% of the Pentagon’s 
intelligence flow on the situation in Korea.33  In the 3 October DIS, Willoughby’s staff cited 
evidence that there were now 20 PLA divisions in North Korea and acknowledged that this 
represented a substantial capability for intervention.34  That same DIS acknowledged Zhou En 
Lai’s recent warnings that China is prepared to intervene and concluded that such threats must be 
taken seriously.35  This report thus shows that the FEC G-2 was aware of both Chinese intentions 
and capabilities to intervene, but within a period of a few days, the analysis from Willoughby’s 
staff began to change in ways that downplayed both China’s intentions and its capabilities to 
intervene decisively.  Another DIS just three days later, revised its estimate of the number of 
Chinese PLA divisions in Northern Korea down from 20 to 9.36 
During the second week of October field reports indicated that large numbers of PLA 
troops were pouring into North Korea, and that even larger numbers were massed on the border 
in Manchuria.37  In a series of DIS’s  issued during the second week of October, FEC G-2 
undermined these field reports, stating at one point that there was “no conclusive evidence” of 
Chinese troops in North Korea.38  Another DIS during this period concluded that Zhou En Lai’s 
recent warnings amounted to an attempt at “diplomatic blackmail.”39  During this same two week 
period in early October, the intelligence requirement priority given to assessing the threat of 
                                                
32Ibid., p. 60. 
33Ibid., p. 63. 
34Haynes, ‘Intelligence failure in Korea’ p. 44.  
35Ibid.  
36Ibid.  
37Rose, ‘Two strategic intelligence mistakes in Korea, 1950’ p.5.  
38Haynes, ‘Intelligence failure in Korea’ p.46.   
39Ibid.  
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Chinese intervention was reduced. On October 3rd  the Chinese threat the top priority, but by 
October 13th it was dropped to the third intelligence requirement priority.40 
What might explain these behaviors?  Justin Haynes argues persuasively that Willoughby 
was consciously altering the FEC G-2 assessments so as to downplay the threat of Chinese 
intervention in the run-up to his boss General MacArthur’s important October 15th meeting with 
Truman at Wake Island.41  Truman and his top advisors had become increasingly alarmed by the 
prospect of Chinese intervention over the prior month, and it was possible that such concern 
could bring Truman to order MacArthur to slow or even halt his march before the final 
destruction of the North Korean Army.42  This behavior is consistent with Bar-Joseph and Levy’s 
“intelligence to please” form of conscious intelligence distortion.43 
During the month of October there is also some evidence that Willoughby may have 
engaged in what Bar-Joseph and Levy classify as the “organizational restructuring” form of 
conscious intelligence distortion.  Working out of an East Asian location, the CIA had 
established contacts with former nationalist Chinese military officers who were now embedded 
in PLA units, and these sources were reporting that large numbers of PLA forces were being 
moved from the South of China up to the Manchurian border with North Korea.44  Some of these 
former nationalist sources put the number of PLA forces on the Manchurian border at 300,000.45  
When Willoughby found out about this CIA operation and the resulting intelligence being 
yielded, he threatened to close down all CIA operations in the area if they didn’t stop passing this 
intelligence to Washington.46 
                                                
40Ibid., p.45.  
41Ibid., p.47.  
42David Halberstam, The coldest winter: America and the Korean War, (NY: Hyperion 2007) p. 378.  
43Bar Joseph and Levy, ‘Conscious action and intelligence failure’, p.462.  
44Halberstam, The coldest winter. p. 380.  
45Rose, ‘Two strategic mistakes in Korea, 1950’ p. 5.  
46Halberstam, The coldest winter, p. 380.  
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There is also evidence that Willoughby took conscious steps to ensure that tactical and 
operational intelligence reports from the field would not make their way into the DIS’s.  Often 
this took the form of cherry picking tactical intelligence that came from the growing numbers of 
interrogations of Chinese POWs in October and November.47 In one particularly dramatic 
instance, Willoughby engaged in some very creative accounting that ended up with a nearly 70% 
underestimation of the numbers of PLA forces in a particular sector.  In a 13 November report, 
Willoughby took intelligence from interrogations that identified PLA units from four separate 
armies in North Korea However, he minimized the order of battle conclusions by only counting 
the troop strength from the four individual units (eg. the battalions) from which the interrogated 
PLA POWs came instead of extrapolating the troop strength of the entire PLA armies they 
represented.48   
The Korean War intelligence failure in perspective 
It is clear that the inability to assess correctly Chinese intentions to intervene in the 
Korean War in the fall of 1950 represents a major producer based intelligence failure.  It is also 
clear that Major General Charles Willoughby was acting as a rogue producer who intentionally 
produced “intelligence to please” his boss General MacArthur.  Because the rest of the 
intelligence community and the Washington interagency were so dependent upon Willoughby 
for their intelligence, his efforts at conscious intelligence distortion had a whole of government 
type of adverse effect.  Willoughby’s failure allowed the entire American government 
(figuratively) and the soldiers of the Eighth Army and X Corps (literally) to march headlong into 
a trap that had been set for them by the Chinese PLA in North Korea. 
                                                
47 Ibid., p. 378. 
48 Haynes, ‘Intelligence failure in Korea’, p. 51. 
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While it is clear that Willoughby was distorting intelligence there is also evidence that 
MacArthur had consciously created a command environment in the Far East Command (FEC), 
where unquestioning support for his preferences was expected, and where dissent and analytical 
questioning were not tolerated.49  Willoughby created a similar command environment within 
FEC G-2.50  This raises an interesting paradox when one attempts to view this episode through 
the lens of the consumer-producer paradigm.  If the consumer (MacArthur) makes it clear to his 
producer (Willoughby) that he expects intelligence products that provide strong support for his 
own operational agenda (e.g. march to the Yalu and destruction of the DKPA by Christmas), and 
the producer complies by distorting intelligence to support the operational agenda, is this really a 
valid example of a producer problem?  One could make the argument that in the end Willoughby 
didn’t do his boss any favors by providing the intelligence that allowed the tragic march into the 
teeth of the Chinese ambush to continue, and in that sense the producer let the consumer down.  
Regardless, Korea is one of the greatest IC failures in American history. 
CASE 2: TET Offensive Vietnam, 1968 
On 30 January 1968 at the start of the Vietnamese New Year holiday (Tet), communist 
forces launched simultaneous attacks across South Vietnam in an effort to generate popular 
uprisings, delegitimize the South Vietnamese government, and deliver a massive symbolic defeat 
to the United States.  In strict military terms the Tet Offensive was a tactical disaster for the 
communist forces: bringing thousands of casualties that would forever cripple the Viet Cong as 
an effective fighting force in the South.  Viewed from a political-strategic standpoint, however, 
Tet dealt a devastating psychological blow that accelerated America’s withdrawal.  However, 
some of the politically damage might have been mitigated: if policy-making principals in 
                                                
49Halberstam, The coldest winter, pp. 372-373.   
50Ibid. , 379.  
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Washington and top military commanders in Saigon had heeded the fairly clear warnings from 
the CIA’s Saigon station.  Regrettably, these warnings were undercut by senior level managers at 
CIA headquarters, who took steps to see that they were not taken seriously by the policy-making 
principals.  Thus, although the Tet Offensive is often listed by as an example of a producer-based 
intelligence failure, this characterization is not convincing.  The breakdown occurred not in the 
collection or analysis stages, but rather at the intelligence management level where the line 
between producer and consumer is sometimes blurred.  This flaw, which we assert is magnified 
when a significant battlefield change takes place during the course of a war (an intra-war 
surprise), is at the heart of the intelligence-policy nexus. 
 One of the interesting patterns that emerges from the Tet case is the difference between 
the sources of intelligence that were used by field analysts and those used by analysts and 
managers at CIA headquarters.51  There was also a difference in the way that incoming 
information was interpreted by field analysts who seemed to be less influenced by the preferred 
strategic vision and strategic assumptions held by three other groups: the top brass at Military 
Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), the policy principals in Washington, and the senior 
analysts and managers.   
Strategic Context 
During the Fall of 1967, President Lyndon Johnson was experiencing mounting political 
pressure to show progress in Vietnam as he headed into an election year.  This led 
Administration officials to pressure the CIA for analysis that would help to shore up domestic 
support for the war.  In September of 1967 National Security Advisor, Walt Rostow asked the 
DCI’s Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs, George Carver for “a list of positive (only) 
                                                
51Alexander Ovodenko, “Visions of the enemy from the field and from abroad: revisiting CIA and military 
expectations of the Tet Offensive,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 34/1 (2011), 121-122.  
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developments in the war effort.”52  In November, President Johnson recalled his Ambassador to 
Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker and MACV commander General William Westmoreland to 
Washington to give a series of congressional briefings and public speeches to boost support for 
the war.  It was here that Westmoreland uttered the infamous phrase about being seeing the 
“light at the end of the tunnel” in Vietnam at a press conference.53  Thus, during the period 
immediately preceding the Tet Offensive, the Johnson Administration was working hard to boost 
positive public perceptions and expectations regarding progress in the war.  These efforts would 
boomerang: becoming a negative force multiplier generate by the psychological damage of Tet.54 
 As commander of MACV, Westmoreland had been pursuing a three part strategy in 
Vietnam since 1965.55  The first stage involved consolidating American combat power in South 
Vietnam to roll back communists gains there, while the second phase focused on having 
American forces attrite communist forces through search and destroy missions while the Army 
of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) focused on civil stability operations at the local level. 56  
The third phase involved American forces either destroying communist main force units or 
pushing them back away from South Vietnam.57  The above-described ways and means were 
deployed toward two sets of strategic objectives.  The first was to use American forces to create 
a shield blocking communist infiltration or invasion into the south, while ARVN engaged in 
counterinsurgency operations there, while the second strategic objective was kill communist 
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forces at a higher rate than they could be replaced, so as to gradually ground down North 
Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) combat power.58 
By the Fall of 1967, it was widely believed by MACV commanders and intelligence 
analysts that Westmoreland’s “shield and attrite” strategy was working.  As James Wirtz 
illustrates compellingly, both Westmoreland and his intelligence analysts began to interpret 
communist behavior as responses or adjustments to the successes of “shield and attrite.”59  Thus 
the Westmoreland strategy had become a reified construct that was influencing the interpretation 
of communist signals and behavior.  When in the Fall of 1967, NVA main force units began to 
attack components of the barrier system that was being constructed near the Demilitarized Zone 
(DMZ), it was assumed that the communists had realized that barrier would reinforce the success 
of the shield portion of the strategy, and so they felt compelled to try to slow down its 
completion.60  However, when captured documents and public pronouncements indicated 
communist plans to initiate a popular uprising in the South, MACV commanders and analysts 
interpreted this as propaganda.  They did so because (in their view) the attrition crossover point 
had already been achieved, and the communists would not have the combat power to sustain the 
kind of offensive operations that could initiate the general uprising.61   
Saigon Station gets it right 
In late November and early December of 1967, analysts at CIA’s Saigon Station led by 
Robert Layton produced a series of three reports that accurately assessed the likelihood of a 
general communist offensive during the early winter period.62  The first two reports were 
produced on November 21st and December 8th, and the third report was produced on December 
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19th.  These assessments were based largely on captured enemy documents and prisoner 
interrogation reports, which were types of sources that MACV analysts and analysts at CIA 
headquarters were less likely to use.63  The first report in late November concluded that the 
communists had shifted strategy from protracted war and were preparing an all-out offensive 
designed to undercut America’s will to continue fighting.64  The second assessment produced on 
December 8th predicted that the communist offensive would begin around the start of the Tet 
holiday and would include, “both large scale continuous attacks by main force units, primarily in 
mountainous areas close to the border sanctuaries and widespread guerrilla attacks on large 
US/GVN units in rural and heavily populated areas.”65  This report was accurate including the 
second phase of the offensive.  It also posited correctly that the communists were attempting to 
lure American forces out to the border areas and away from the urban targets of the coming 
offensive.66  The third report, which was produced on December 19th drew on new, corroborating 
indicators, and elaborated upon the prescient predictions put forward in the second report.  This 
analysis posited that the communists had probably overestimated their ability to carry out 
countrywide attacks successfully, and so the attacks would probably fail militarily, but that the 
communists were committed to the widespread offensive nonetheless.67  Overall these three 
assessments from Saigon Station produced six to ten weeks before Tet could have provided 
policy-making principals in Washington accurate warning of what was to come at the start of the 
Tet holiday.   
The Saigon Station assessments were sent to George Carver, the Special Assistant for 
Vietnam Affairs (SAVA).  Carver was in an unusual position as an analytical manager because 
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of his close contacts with senior White House and Pentagon officials.68  Upon receiving the 8 
December assessment, Carver sent it to the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) for appraisal.  
The OCI critiqued the Saigon Station analysis for putting too much stock in captured documents 
which might be propaganda or disinformation.  OCI also disagreed with Saigon Station’s 
inference that the communists had changed their strategy from one of protracted warfare to a 
more forward leaning offensive orientation.69  OCI thus stuck with the pre-existing CIA 
assessment.  This OCI assessment was consistent with a new CIA HQ assessment held that the 
communists would continue to pursue a protracted war strategy because their military capability 
had been eroding over the last year or so.70  It should be noted that this view of communist 
strategy is similar to the view held by MACV analysts and commanders in that it was influenced 
by the reification of the Westmoreland strategy (i.e. the notion that his strategy was working and 
thus the communists were forced to shape their strategy to take this into account).  
Ultimately George Carver did pass the Saigon Station assessments on to Walt Rostow, 
but he did so under a cover letter in which he said they “should not be read as the considered 
opinion of this agency.”71  The cover letter also reiterated the consensus CIA HQ assessment that 
the communists would continue their protracted war strategy.72  Carver seriously undercut what 
might have been a very useful warning, but was telling Rostow what he (and LBJ) wanted to 
hear. 
Late warnings and reactions 
During the first two weeks of January 1968, indicators of an imminent communist 
offensive began to trickle in at both the tactical and operational level.  During the first week of 
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January, Lieutenant General Frederick Weyand, who was the II Field Force commander (and 
was thus responsible for the III Corps Tactical Zone [CTZ] and Saigon), began to receive 
intelligence that a communist offensive was pending.73  Based on the strength of these indicators, 
Weyand persuaded Westmoreland to postpone a planned operation in the border area that would 
have taken a significant number of his troops away from Saigon at Tet.74  It is clear that had 
Weyand not heeded the intelligence and pressed Westmoreland, the communists would have had 
greater success in their offensive.  Thus, at least in the III CTZ, the Tet Offensive cannot be said 
to represent an intelligence failure in the traditional sense. The consumers (Weyand and 
Westmoreland) both heeded the warnings of the producers: the field analysts. 
Indeed by the second week of January, General Westmoreland had received enough 
intelligence from various tactical and operational sources to become convinced a countrywide 
communist offensive might be launched before the month was over.  On January 15, 
Westmoreland phoned South Vietnamese President Thieu and told him that he thought the odds 
of such an offensive occurring before Tet to be 60/40.75  By the early morning of January 30th, 
the day the communist offensive was to be launched, Westmoreland was so concerned he sent 
out a flash priority message to all of his commanders calling for a maximum level of alert.76  He 
also contacted every one of his senior commanders individually to warn them of the likelihood of 
an imminent widespread communist offensive.77  While Westmoreland had at least two weeks to 
seriously ponder the prospect of a country-wide communist offensive and to prepare his forces 
for it, the same cannot be said of the policy making principals in Washington.  Even though there 
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were analytical products like the Saigon Station assessments that could have provided the 
principals with upwards of two months-worth of warning, the potential policy value of those 
products was undercut by analytical managers at CIA headquarters like George Carver, who, in 
retrospect, had pressured to do so from the Johnson Whitehouse. This “intelligence to please” 
helped drive LBJ from politics. 
Tet: Final Observations  
The failure to warn policy makers of the approaching Tet Offensive cannot be classified 
simply as a producer-based intelligence failure because the analytical community developed 
products that accurately predicted the nature and timing of the communist offensive two months 
before the event.  But to what extent can it be considered to be a consumer-based “failure of 
intelligence,” meaning a failure by policy-principals in Washington?  Because accurate analytical 
products from Saigon Station were undercut by Carver and other IC analytical managers, we 
cannot say that the principals received unambiguous warning and failed to craft a proper policy 
response.  On the other hand it is perhaps prudent to ask what the principals would have done if 
they had received such an unambiguous warning two months before the attacks were launched?  
Would they have clung to the established assumptions that had held Westmoreland and his 
MACV analysts in sway for most of 1967?  Would they have rejected the incoming intelligence 
because it didn’t match their core assumption about dwindling communist combat power and the 
effectiveness of the American shield strategy?  What sorts of difficult public policy changes 
could they have considered making over a two month span that would have made a difference at 
the strategic level?  Certainly in hindsight, preparing the American people for a communist 
offensive to might have mitigated the psychological shock that occurred in the wake of the Tet. 
However, without the benefit of hindsight it is equally true that the Johnson Administration (like 
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others) was averse to incurring the inherent political risks of admitting errors. They had pushed 
the IC to provide “only good news” and the senior managers had complied. 
Perhaps the most interesting pattern that emerges from the Tet Offensive case is the fact 
that CIA analysts in the field performed so much better than analysts back at the CIA 
headquarters in Langley in terms of their ability to provide timely and accurate predictive 
analysis.  As Alexander Ovodenko points out, this could be explained by the fact that the 
analysts in the field made use of different types of sources (e.g. captured documents and enemy 
interrogations) than those available to the analysts back at headquarters.78  The fact that the field 
analysts at Saigon Station performed better than the HQ analysts and their managers goes against 
the grain of the dominant pattern of inference that emerges from the agent-principal paradigm: a 
paradigm which would lead us to expect that the agents (e.g. the field analysts) would take 
advantage of their location in the operational environment to manipulate informational 
asymmetries between themselves and the principals in order to pursue independent policy 
agendas.79  If anything it was the principals and analyst-managers like Carver who seemed 
inclined to shape analytical products so that they were more supportive of pre-existing policy 
agendas. Psychologically it seems that “closer to the top” of the hierarchy that one gets in the 
intelligence-policy nexus, individuals are less willing to examine new information in an agnostic 
fashion. 
Case 3: The 1979 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan  
Discovering “the truth” is the goal of most intelligence collectors and conveying this 
truth to policymakers who need it is the primary mission of every intelligence analyst.  The 
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biblical quest for the truth, “And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free” (John 
8:32), is engraved into the marble wall in the entrance to the Headquarters Building at the CIA.  
However, finding truth often starts with a debate about an opponent’s intent and probable 
courses of action (COAs), and sometimes decision-makers defy even the best analyst’s 
predictions. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is one such case.  
In April 1978 a bloody military coup took place in Afghanistan that brought to power a 
small group of Soviet-trained officers and their political partners in the fledgling Afghan 
Communist Party. Over the course of the next eighteen months, the new Afghan leaders quickly 
moved to build a political alliance with their socialist patrons in Moscow, and on 5 December 
1978 a treaty was signed between the two countries which three weeks later would become part 
of the legal foundation for the coming Soviet intervention.80 
By rapidly instituting an array of bad policies too long to list here,81 the new communist 
Afghan leadership quickly inspired a country-wide rebellion. As their internal control ebbed in 
the spring and summer of 1979, the tempo of Soviet involvement military increased. However, 
as late as 23 December 1979, the Soviet news media was denying Western claims that Red Army 
troops were mobilized for intervention in Afghanistan. Pravda referred to these claims as ‘pure 
fabrications,’ quoting Afghan President Hafizullah Amin as saying, ‘The Soviet Union has never 
infringed on our sovereignty ... is not doing so, and never will.’82 One day later, on Christmas 
Eve 1979, Soviet forces began their invasion of Afghanistan, and shortly thereafter assassinated 
Mr. Amin. 
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 American policy officials, including President Jimmy Carter, almost unanimously 
expressed surprise over the Soviet move--especially its size and scope.  Over the subsequent 
years, as referenced in the Foreign Policy article above, the Soviet invasion has become 
considered by some observers to be a “top 10” producer-based failure for the American IC.83  
With the benefit of history, and the subsequent declassification of various documents and first-
hand reports from participants, we can now make a more nuanced assessment of the American 
producers and consumers in this case. 
What the new data tell us is that Soviet decision-makers did not fully finalize their plans 
until mid-December 1979: only two weeks before the large-scale operation began on 24 
December of that year.  However, tantalizing statements appearing in Soviet military journals 
early in 1979 indicate that Soviet theorists were building their case for the containment of 
‘imperialist’ aggression. One Colonel K. Vorobiev stated, ‘Experience shows that only by using 
armed force can one defend the revolutionary conquests from the attacks of imperialist 
interventionists, surprise the attacks of the enemies of social progress, and assure the 
development of a country proceeding along a socialist path.’84 Much like the American Cold 
War imagery of communist dominos falling from Vietnam, Afghanistan’s internal troubles were 
perceived in the Kremlin as being fomented by the Soviet Union’s enemies, namely the US and 
China.  Articles in the official Soviet press spoke of increased infiltration by ‘counter-
revolutionary’ forces and warned that the USSR could not remain indifferent to Pakistani and 
Chinese cooperation directed against Afghanistan.85 
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 Even in the early 1980s it was known that various Soviet officials conducted fact-finding 
missions to assess the situation on the ground in Afghanistan from April to August 1979, but 
their opinions varied.  Lieutenant General Gorelov, the Soviet’s Chief Military Adviser in 
Afghanistan, counseled against any further Soviet deployments.  However, his analysis was 
reportedly countered by the senior in-country KGB officer, Lieutenant General Invanov, who 
argued greater military intervention should take place.  Then General Ivan G. Pavlovskii, the 
Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff and Commander of Soviet Ground Forces, and a 
specialist on military intervention, was sent on another fact-finding mission in August.  It is 
worth noting that he had made a trip to Czechoslovakia in 1968 before the Soviet invasion of that 
country (and Pavlovskii had commanded the invading Eastern-bloc troops).  Pavlovskii surveyed 
the Afghan situation from August to October 1979, eventually recommending against further 
Soviet involvement on the grounds that it lacked a clear military mission.86 
However, a month earlier an official CIA Alert Memorandum dated 14 September was 
sent from Admiral Stansfield Turner (then Director of Central Intelligence) to the President 
Carter and other senior officials warning, "The Soviet leaders may be on the threshold of a 
decision to commit their own forces to prevent the collapse of the regime and to protect their 
sizable stakes in Afghanistan."87  According to the CIA’s Douglas MacEachin this memorandum 
also observed that Moscow was sensitive to the potentially open-ended military and political 
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costs that could result from such a venture. Because of this sensitivity, if the Soviets eventually 
did increase their military role, they were likely to do so only incrementally--raising the number 
of military advisors, expanding involvement in combat operations, and possibly bringing in small 
units to provide security in key cities. The Alert Memorandum further acknowledged that, even if 
the commitment initially was limited to incremental steps, the Soviets would risk amplifying 
their stake in the ultimate outcome, making it harder to resist further increasing their military 
commitment if their initial steps did not produce the results they sought.88  Clearly, the IC 
producers had first warned the main consumer (President Carter) about the threat in September, 
but the specifics (dates, size and scope) were lacking.  In retrospect, it is clear these details were 
lacking because declassified document now show that they had not been decided by the Soviet 
leadership. 
Indeed, the end of the Cold War has witnessed the release of additional documents and 
memoirs that provide a better understanding of the Soviets’ conflicting views.  One of the best 
examples is the work by Aleksandr Lyakhovskiy,89 who reports both on the KGB head Uri 
Andropov’s key role in promoting the invasion to Secretary Brezhnev, as well the uniformed 
military’s strong opposition (only two weeks before the invasion).  Additional Soviet 
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perspectives are provided by KGB officials Victor Cherkashin and Oleg Kalugin.90 Russian 
sources report that on 8 December Brezhnev gave KGB Chief Andropov, Premier Gromyko and 
Defense Secretary Ustinov verbal approval for the intervention and the official documents were 
signed a few days later.91  According to one American Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) analyst 
working at the time for the National Security Agency (NSA), “this order resulted in the buildup 
of Soviet Guards and Motorized Rifle Divisions and the mobilization of Airborne troops that I 
observed in my job as a Traffic Analyst in mid-December 1979.”92 
US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski, later indicated this SIGINT material 
was funneled to President Carter very quickly.  After personally reading intelligence reports that 
a second Soviet airborne battalion had arrived in Afghanistan, Carter told Brezinski that he 
wanted to make that information on Soviet movements public by 15 December.93  However, 
there was concern inside the Administration over how to release the information in a “sanitized” 
manner: clearly reflecting a need to protect the sources and methods of intel collection.94  On 17 
December the quickly evolving Afghan situation was taken up at a meeting of senior national 
security officials (initially called to address the Iran hostage crisis).   At that meeting, Admiral 
Turner (updating the agency’s 14 September Alert Memorandum) reported that the recent 
movement of new Soviet units to Afghanistan (including a third airborne battalion added to their 
existing forces at Bagram airbase) raised the number of Soviet military personnel there to an 
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estimated 5,300. He also indicated that two new Soviet command posts had been created just 
north of the Afghan border, that two more divisions in the vicinity appeared readied for 
movement, and that a logistic buildup of air assets was underway.95 According to the record of 
the meeting, the Director Turner stated: 
CIA does not see this as a crash buildup but rather as a steady, planned buildup, 
perhaps related to Soviet perceptions of a deterioration of the Afghan military 
forces and the need to beef them up at some point. ... We believe that the Soviets 
have made a political decision to keep a pro-Soviet regime in power and to use 
military force to that end if necessary. They either give this a higher priority than 
SALT [the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty being debated at that time in the US 
Congress] or they may believe it is irrelevant to SALT. 96 
 
On 19 December, the President of the United States, who according to Brzezinski had been 
monitoring the daily intel reports on Iran and Afghanistan for some time, was officially 
conveyed this information in a new Alert Memorandum.97  Two days later, on December 21, six 
days after Carter’s initial suggested date for release, the Administration began releasing details of 
the expanded Soviet deployments both inside Afghanistan and on the border.  
Neither a Producer nor Consumer Failure: A Strategic Imperative 
   The fact that the President and his national security team took no significant outward 
actions based on the string of warnings of a possible Soviet invasion that had started in 
September 1979 does not make this a case of failure by either the consumers or the producers of 
intelligence.  The record is clear: Carter was not only informed by the IC, but he was intensely 
focused on the region after the Iranian hostage crises began on 4 November. Carter viewed the 
evolving Soviet-Afghan situations through that critical lens, and he was involved in deciding 
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when to go public with the information of the Soviet build-up, initially pushing for 15 December.  
One might ask, why would the US President not act more boldly to try and prevent the USSR 
from invading its Afghanistan? What would be gained, what might be lost?  These sorts of 
strategic decisions are made by senior officials considering various courses of action (COAs).  
As well-described in Graham Allison’s, seminal work, Essence of Decision (1971), any potential 
COA must be evaluated for the following: the national interest involved, the likeliness for 
success in achieving that interest, and the risk (cost) of failure. 
 What were US national interests in Afghanistan?  Certainly, in very broad terms any 
Soviet expansion was generally viewed as negative for the USA in the broader public narrative 
of the Cold War.  However, since the late 1950’s the USA had (rightly or wrongly) informally 
ceded Afghanistan to Soviet sphere of influence and instead focused its strategy of containment 
on the borders of Iran and Pakistan.98  For the USA in 1979, Afghanistan was a peripheral geo-
political interest, but Soviet activities in the region mattered to the USA because of turmoil in 
Iran, an oil-rich state which it was “losing” to revolution, but also did not want to also “lose” to 
the USSR.  
Given this basic premise, we should consider the alternative COA options that President 
Carter might have pondered: 
1. Taking a page from President Kennedy’s public confrontation with the USSR over 
missiles in Cuba in 1961, Carter could have confronted the Soviets openly over their 
plans to invade, and threatened them with a military response.  What were the likely 
rewards and risks of taking such an aggressive stance?  Even the most sophomoric 
military assessment would have shown that the USSR, with its shared border with 
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Afghanistan held all the necessary conventional war-fighting advantages (logistic and 
communication lines) for defeating any overt US force package.  It is unlikely that 
Pakistan or Iran (already in the throes of the Islamic Revolution in December, 1979) 
would have allowed the US access through their territories and the USA had no formal 
alliance or relationship with the then pro-Soviet government of Afghanistan that it was 
obligated to honor.  Such a military threat would be seen as weak, hollow, and in making 
it Carter would undermine US credibility.  However, once the USSR invaded 
Afghanistan, Carter did “draw the line” at further Soviet expansion in the oil-rich Gulf 
region by uttering the now famous doctrine (the Carter Doctrine) that bears his name. 
2. Carter could have issued a demarche the Soviet leadership privately.  The record shows 
that he did so.  On 15 December the Secretary of State's Cyrus Vance’s special advisor on 
Soviet affairs, Marshal Schulman, called in the chargé from the Soviet Embassy and 
asked that Moscow provide an explanation for the sudden increase of its military 
presence in Afghanistan. A cable was also sent that day to the US Embassy in Moscow 
instructing the ambassador to put the same question directly to the Soviet Foreign 
Ministry.99 
3.  Carter could take no bolder action than the private demarches, which were rebuffed.  By 
following this path his team had time to prepare the public statements concerning their 
shock and outrage over this “surprise” invasion, and to formulate the outlines of the 
Carter Doctrine.  Even though the US threatened no direct military response, the Soviets 
could be made to pay a price in world outrage.  Later, they would pay in the loss of the 
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ongoing SALT II talks, in the US led boycott of the Moscow Olympics, and in the 
cancellation of grain exports from the USA. 
Finally, the record now suggests that we must consider an even more fascinating hypothesis: the 
US “did nothing” to prevent the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan because such an invasion was 
the fulfillment of an American policy goal (albeit one not expressed publically).  One part of the 
record is clear: the United States had begun to support the Afghan resistance following the 
issuance of a classified finding signed by Carter on 3 July 1979.100  This covert program, later 
popularized by the book and movies titled “Charlie Wilson’s War”101 is generally associated 
with President Reagan, under whose watch it was greatly expanded and popularized.  However, 
what is most perhaps most intriguing question may be the intent behind Carter’s policy: what 
outcome was Carter was trying to achieve with the covert program that was initiated under his 
watch?  In a news conference on 28 December 1979, President Carter described the Soviet 
military intervention in Afghanistan as a blatant violation of international norms and a ‘grave 
threat to peace.’ In his memoirs Carter recalls, ‘The worst disappointment to me personally was 
the immediate and automatic loss of any chance for the early ratification of the SALT II treaty. 
Furthermore, the situation created a threat to both Iran and Pakistan which had not existed 
previously. If the Soviets could consolidate their hold on Afghanistan, the balance of power in 
the entire region would be drastically modified in their favor, and they might be tempted toward 
further aggression. We were resolved to do everything feasible to prevent such a turn of 
events.’102  These statements may be true after the Soviet invasion, but they have no relation to 
                                                
100 Robert M. Gates, op cit. pp. 146. 
101 George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of How the Wildest Man in Congress and a Rogue 
CIA Agent Changed the History of Our Times.  Grove  Books, 2007.  
102Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982) p. 473. 
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the question at hand: what was Carter trying to achieve by supporting the Afghan rebels in the 
months leading up to the Soviet action? 
In presenting history this way, Carter may have been telling “the truth,” but was it “the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth?”  Alternatively, were his memoirs sanitized so that: 1) he 
could maintain his strong public image as a man of peace and champion of human rights; 2) he 
did indeed regret the loss of the SALT II treaty, but also did not want to publically admit that his 
policy of supporting the Afghan rebels had helped motivate the Soviet invasion, and as a result 
ruined the chance for the treaty’s passage.  These speculations only became potentially credible 
two decades later when Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski told a French 
newspaper that he wrote to the President on 3 July 1979 and stated that Carter’s decision to 
provide aid to the Afghan resistance (in the classified presidential finding) would induce a Soviet 
intervention.  On the day of the Soviet invasion, (24 December), he claims to have written 
Carter, ‘We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War.’  Further 
documentary evidence provided by the Carter Library seems to confirm this claim. In a 26 
December memo Brzezinski writes to Carter stating:  
As I mentioned to you a week or so ago, are now facing a regional crisis 
[emphasis in original].  Both Iran and Afghanistan are in turmoil, and Pakistan is 
both unstable and extremely apprehensive externally. If the Soviets succeed in 
Afghanistan, and if Pakistan acquiesces, the age-long dream of Moscow to have 
direct access to the Indian Ocean will have been fulfilled. Historically, the British 
provided the barrier to that drive and Afghanistan was their buffer state. We 
assumed that role in 1945, but the Iranian crisis has lead to the collapse of the 
balance of power in Southwest Asia, and it could produce Soviet presence right 
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down on the edge of the Arabian and Oman Gulfs.  Accordingly, the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan poses for us an extremely grave challenge, both 
internationally and domestically. While it could become a Soviet Vietnam 
[emphasis added], the initial effects of the intervention are likely to be adverse for 
us…103 
In the ensuing discussions one can imagine the famous Carter Doctrine was formulated, “Let our 
position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf 
region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and 
such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”104 
Brzezinski also claimed in the 1998 interview, “Indeed, for almost 10 years, Moscow had 
to carry on a war unsupportable by the government, a conflict that brought about the 
demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire.”105 Whether or not the reader is 
convinced by Brzezinski’s exact memory, for the focus of this paper, the argument can no longer 
be made that Carter was surprised by the Soviet invasion.  By “doing little or nothing” to stop the 
invasion in Afghanistan when “doing something” held very few rewards, Carter’s decision was 
both rational and prudent.  Moreover, if Brzezinski’s memory is historically correct, then baiting 
the Soviets into an “Afghan trap” was the President Carter’s conscious policy objective all along.  
We concur with Robert Gates who observes the following: “In fact, Carter and Brezinksi saw the 
Soviets beginning to increase work on a covert response nine months before [the invasion], and 
implemented a covert finding to help the insurgents resist the Soviets almost six months before 
                                                
103 “Reflections on Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan.”  Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski. 
Declassified 28 April 2008.  Made available by Kieth J. Shuler, Archivist, Jimmy Carter Library and Museum. NSA 
Materials: Brzezinski Materials, Country Files, Box 1. Sent to author via PDF 29 January 2013. 
 
104 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carter_Doctrine. Accessed 10 May 2013. 
105 Le Nouvel Observateur, Paris, 15-21 January 1998. Translated from the French by William Blum and David N. 
Gibbs. See Gibbs review essay, "Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Retrospect," International Politics 37, no. 2, 
2000, pp 233-246.   
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the Soviet move.”106  As such, no producer-based surprise or intelligence failure took place, and 
the ultimate consumer (President Carter) may have achieved exactly what he first intended, even 
though (perhaps to his chagrin) doing so later resulted in the loss of SALT II.   
Why correct history?  
It is clear from these three cases that rarely are the genuine stories behind so called 
“intelligence failures” as simplistic as they are portrayed in the popular press.  Likewise, one of 
the major goals of the social sciences, to build conceptual models that then allow theorizing of 
various levels to take place, often require a dilution of history’s important nuances.  The 
complexity of the real world and the lack of clarity that often permeates the intelligence-policy 
nexus is one that is rarely satisfying for people wanting to know “the truth” of history years later.  
As events unfold in real time, sometimes the best that can be hoped for is “muddling through” by 
the participants.  However, eventually history can be written more accurately - even if it takes 
years for sufficient data to become available. With better history, better social science will result, 
but first the history must be told accurately.  
Regrettably, much of the American record remains classified, and the level of 
understanding that we have of the dynamics of the consumer-producer relationships inside the 
three cases varies considerably.  For example we simply don’t have the level of detail regarding 
the interaction between producers and consumers in the Afghan case that we were able to see in 
the Vietnam and Korea cases.  On the Soviet side, almost all of the KGB officials both in the 
field and in Moscow were for greater military involvement, while most of the high-ranking 
Soviet military officers were against it.  This may simply be a product of traditional Soviet-style 
bureaucratic politics in which the inclination for subordinates to tell their bosses what they think 
they want to hear is particularly strong in an authoritarian state.  It could be the case that 
                                                
106 Gates, From the Shadows, p. 149. 
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subordinate KGB officers simply lined up behind the known opinion of their boss (Yuri 
Andropov) and alternatively, subordinate generals also voiced opinions which echoed those 
holding higher-rank.  Likewise, on the American side, we have not been able to find any other 
memoirs that affirm Brzezinski’s claim that Carter’s Afghan policies were consciously designed 
to lure the Soviets into a quagmire.  Brzezinski might be faulted a decade later for remembering 
things in a manner which appears to make him more prescient in the Le Nouvel Observateur 
interview, however the declassified NSA memo from 26 December sited above from the Carter 
Library lends credence to his claim.  The record is now clear: President Carter was keenly 
focused on both Iran and Afghanistan, and feigning “surprise” must have been deemed valuable 
in the subsequent public diplomacy, the articulation of the Carter Doctrine, and execution of the 
information campaign against the USSR. 
But why does it matter if an event is mis-labeled an “intelligence failure” and history not 
corrected later on?  First, the broader American IC can do very little to defend itself when the 
predictable wave of criticism is heaped upon it by pundits in the months and years following 
events, but should its personnel suffer under these dark clouds forever?  It is a typical American 
trait to believe that any failure can either be traced to a fault in either in a process or in the 
actions of a person.  If the fault lies in the process, the process must be “fixed” so that the fault 
does not recur.  If the fault is in the actions of a person, then the answer is to determine if there 
was insufficient training, (really a process problem – and one which can be fixed); or whether the 
person was negligent, incompetent, or traitorous, (the requiring the person to suffer variable 
consequences).  However, events that are mislabeled as intelligence failures when they are 
actually failures in leadership (or even successes, as perhaps Afghanistan was for Carter) might 
result in procedures and protocols that were not broken being “fixed,” and/or persons who were 
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behaving properly becoming scapegoats.  All of this “fixing” involves investigations, studies, 
commissions, and reorganizations that, if there is no legitimate problem, result in wasted 
resources and new layers of bureaucracy that can be detrimental to intelligence organizations and 
personnel.  The confidence of both policymakers and the public are eroded, causing 
policymakers to become more likely to disregard their intelligence professionals in the future.  
After all, “if they failed on X, why should I believe what they say about Y?” 
The bottom line is this: secret activities are inherently distrusted in open, democratic 
societies.  The actions of intelligence officers – deceiving others, using false identities to obtain 
information, stealing secrets – are much too close to those of a criminal for most Americans to 
feel comfortable.  American popular media feeds this distrust by portraying as heroes many 
“rogues” who rebel against the (evil) intelligence organization to do the right thing.  When the 
real world also presents fictional “intelligence failures” to mask failures of policy or leadership 
the perpetrators do a disservice both to the intelligence officers who take on real risks and 
hardships to do their jobs, and to the current and future policymakers who will believe these 
falsehoods and will likely try to “fix” the problem.  In the case Afghanistan, it is clear that 
President Carter decided to feigning public surprise in order to build support for his developing 
anti-Soviet policies.  A pragmatist can even understand why this public deception served national 
security goals.  But how long must the charade continue? 
While it may be fair to expect intelligence professionals to stay silent and accept unfair 
criticism in order to protect sources and methods, and it may be unrealistic to expect politicians 
to be truthful in their memoirs, the academic community is professionally obligated to eventually 
step in and correct the record.  The human stakes are very high in the “real” (or non-academic) 
world of national security and intelligence.  Mistakes ruin lives and often get people killed.  
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Wars start and nation-states sometimes fail as a result.  We profoundly believe it is very 
important to avoid learning the wrong lessons from past cases like Tet or Afghanistan because 
those wrong lessons might lead to costly or even deadly mistakes in future national security 
challenges.  If we are to truly learn from our past and develop our intelligence community to 
meet future needs we must separate real failures, like Korea, from the false examples like Tet 
and Afghanistan. 
